

The Jewish Exodus from the New South Africa: Realities and Implications

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ABSTRACT

In the 1990s, the Jewish population of South Africa declined at an unprecedented rate in marked contrast to Jewish populations in other English-speaking countries.

Possible explanations include fear of political instability and political violence, deteriorating economic conditions and prospects, fear of directly discriminatory government policies, rising violent crime rates, and more permissive immigration policies in desirable destination countries.

All but the last of these factors appear to have played some role. However, only changes in violent crime rates provide an explanation for the unprecedented surge in net emigration, persisting even after a successful political and economic transition to majority black rule under moderate African National Congress governments.

Changes in crime rates also provide the most satisfactory explanation for related changes in internal migration patterns.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1945, English-speaking countries have been one of the primary destinations of Jewish migrants. Many Holocaust survivors relocated to the US, Canada (particularly Toronto), and Australia (particularly Melbourne). More recently, Soviet Jews and large numbers of Israelis have moved to the US and other English-speaking countries. South Africa, however, presents a different

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picture. Not only has it *not* served as one of the beacons for Jewish immigration, but in the past 30 years it has become a major source of emigration to other English-speaking countries, and to a lesser extent Israel.

This emigration accelerated dramatically in the 1990s, becoming one of the main themes of contemporary South African Jewish life. During the 1970s and 1980s, new and returning Jewish immigration offset emigration to a significant extent. But immigration slowed sharply during the 1990s.

In the postwar period through the 1980s, South African Jewish internal migration was typically from rural communities and smaller cities to major urban centres, particularly Johannesburg and Cape Town. More recently, Jews are migrating from traditional Jewish inner city neighbourhoods, such as Hillbrow in Johannesburg, to outlying suburbs, and more generally from Johannesburg to Cape Town. The last decade has also seen the continued relative growth of traditional religious communities, albeit from a base population already unusually traditional compared with those of other English-speaking countries.

Why has the 1990s seen such a dramatic decline in the Jewish population of South Africa? Why is the rapidly shrinking remainder increasingly concentrating in Cape Town, in a few Johannesburg suburbs, and in a few more urban traditional religious communities in Johannesburg and Cape Town? This article examines a number of possible causes of the decline and restructuring of the South African Jewish population. Migration is often driven by actual and expected macroeconomic trends. In South Africa, much economic uncertainty has been associated with the 1994 shift to black majority rule. Political instability and particularly political violence – and fear of such in the future – is another important determinant of migration. In South Africa, surges of political violence were marked by the 1976 Soweto uprising and the 1985 State of Emergency, and renewed political violence was feared in the run up to the 1994 elections. Whites have also feared that race-based hiring quotas are becoming a significant obstacle to economic advancement. Since the early 1990s, there has also been a dramatic surge both in general violent crime rates, and in the proportionate exposure of the wealthier white population to violent crime. It is also possible that emigration has been fueled by changing policies in preferred destination countries, such as Australia, the UK, and the US. Although incomplete statistical evidence makes explanation more conjectural than usual, we argue that variation in the timing and rate of change of net emigration during the 1990s is best accounted for by changes in exposure to violent crime. This conclusion is strengthened by consistent changes in internal migration patterns, and in socio-religious structure, and by the findings of the 1998 National Survey by the Kaplan Centre and the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (KC/IJPR).¹

Following a review of the history of the South African Jewish community, the first part of this article examines patterns of emigration, immigration, and

internal migration. The second part examines a series of possible explanations for dramatic changes during the 1990s, and discusses their likely relative importance. This discussion is then supplemented with an analysis of individual-level data from the 1998 KC/IJPR National Survey. The final part addresses the communal impact of recent changes and discusses future possibilities.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF JEWS IN SOUTH AFRICA

A handful of persons of Jewish ancestry – Dutch, German, and English – lived in South Africa from around the time of first white settlement as employees of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 (Herrman, 1935; Saron and Hotz, 1956; Elazar and Medding, 1983; Arkin, 1984). However, the fact that the Dutch East India Company required that colonists conform to the Dutch Reformed religion effectively prevented any practicing Jews from settling at the Cape Colony, as it was then called (Elazar with Medding, 1983: 137). The first Jews to establish communities in South Africa were British Jews who arrived when the British first occupied the Cape around 1806; their numbers increased after 1820 and by 1880 there were an estimated 4,000 in the Cape Colony. By 1891 the number had increased to 10,000, and by 1899 to about 24,000 (Saron and Hotz, 1956: 89). Most of these early Jewish settlers, primarily the English but also some Germans, were upper middle class and included many doctors, lawyers, other professionals, and many merchants (Elazar with Medding, 1983: 166).

Jewish communal life emerged around the 1840s. The first Jewish congregation, called Tikvath Israel (Hope of Israel), was established in Cape Town in 1841. Other milestones included the first register of Jewish births and deaths (1843), the first Jewish marriage (1844), the first burial in the new Jewish cemetery (1844), the arrival of the first Sefer Torah (scroll of the five books of Moses), and the first *mohel* (ritual circumciser) (1847). Over time, Jewish settlers spread throughout the Colony in search of opportunities. The founding dates of the other main Jewish communities were: Port Elizabeth, 1862; Kimberley, 1875; Durban, 1883, Johannesburg, 1887, and Pretoria, 1890 (Elazar with Medding, 1983: 153).

Between the late 1840s and late 1860s, however, Jewish communities in the Cape Colony were struggling to survive. The weak economy was a disincentive to immigration, and many Jews intermarried and assimilated with the Christian majority. By the 1870s, however, the various Jewish communities had become more firmly rooted due in no small part to the discovery of gold and diamonds on the Witwatersrand (Saron, 1965: 10-11; Herman, 1941: 32-33).

Beginning in 1880, the character of South African Jewry was forever changed. Between 1880 to 1910 some 40,000 Jews immigrated from Eastern Europe,

and another 30,000 between 1910 and 1948 (Shimoni, 1980; Shimoni, 1988: 10). They were part of the vast numbers of persons – including some 3,000,000 Jews – who left Europe, many fleeing political oppression, warfare and/or economic hardship; others were driven by the spirit of adventure and the lure of greater opportunities in the “new land”.

Not only did most of these Jews come from Lithuania and Byelorussia, but an estimated 80 to 85 per cent of all Jews in South Africa came from a relatively few places in these regions. As a result, the character of South African Jewry is very Lithuanian, or *Litvak* in Yiddish terminology. A *Litvak* is a Jew who came from the pre-1917 Czarist Russian provinces of Vilna, Kovno, Grodno, and Northern Suwalki, areas that were Lithuanian-Polish in character; or from Vitebsk, Minsk, and Mogilev, areas that were Byelorussian in character. Because of inexact record-keeping practices during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is difficult to prove the estimate of 80 to 85 per cent. However, circumstantial evidence indicates that this figure is probably credible. Even prior to the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899, more than half the estimated 24,000 Jews in South Africa were Eastern Europeans; there were also about 7,000 British Jews and about 3,000 German Jews. Many of the German Jews had lived in England before coming to South Africa, as had a good percentage of the Eastern Europeans (Shimoni, 1980: 5-6, 12).

Although many Lithuanian immigrants settled in urban areas, other “pioneers” chose to seek fortunes in less developed areas such as Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State. Many became peddlers on the veld (the great Southern African plains), eventually opening prosperous country stores (Elazar with Medding, 1983: 169). Lithuanian Jews in the town of Oudtshoorn in the Karoo province area were pioneers in the ostrich feather trade which developed into an important import-export business.² Although they could not legally hold public office or be in the civil service, many early Jewish settlers were considered respectable leaders in their wider communities and also became active in building their own communities.

Jews were allowed to enter South Africa fairly freely until intake was curtailed severely by the Quota Act of 1930. Then the Aliens Act of 1937 effectively stopped all further immigration with the exception of a few thousand Jewish refugees from Germany taken *in extremis* (Dubb, 1994: 10). From the 1930s until the early 1970s only a small number of Jews entered South Africa (Dubb, 1994: 10). Near cessation for a period of 30 to 40 years reinforced the already homogenous character of South Africa’s Jewish community and created an even more homogeneous, native-born, cohesive and unified community. The majority of South African Jews feel that their roots are in the same place and that they share the same values. There was no major influx of newcomers to create demand for pluralistic models of integrating different types of Jews into the Jewish community.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN JEWRY

Developments in the 1990s are compared with main trends and characteristics during the 1970s and 1980s. Figure 1 (page 28) shows postwar changes in the size of the Jewish population at dates for which relatively reliable data are available. Census data are unreliable for 1991 and 1996. “Low estimates” for 1991 and 1996 are based on official census data, with upward adjustment for estimated non-participation. “High estimates” for 1991 and 1998 are based on communal data for the largest urban Jewish communities, adjusted for the estimated size of excluded communities.³ Figure 2 (page 29) shows the same information, but in the more easily comparable terms of annual rates of change. Steady declines in the rate of increase of the population from 1946-80 turned into a more rapid decline in 1980-91 and a dramatic collapse in 1991-96 (low estimates) and 1991-98 (high estimates). Since the true population figures for 1991 and 1996/98 are likely to be somewhere between the low and high estimates, it seems that the 1990s represent a fundamental departure, with yearly declines accelerating from 1-2 per cent to over 4 per cent per annum. The latter trend, which shows every indication of continuing, calls into question the long-term viability of the Jewish community in anything like its present form.

Dubb’s 1991 demographic analysis shows that the main source of recent changes is net emigration. A secondary factor is a declining, now significantly negative, birthrate. Although low birthrates are typical of affluent populations in contemporary developed countries, the unusually rapid decline among South African Jews is largely a consequence of the relatively youthful age structure of emigrants.

Emigration and immigration

Emigration rates were high from the 1970s to the 1990s. Unusually large losses occurred during the late 1970s and mid-to-late 1980s, periods of internal political unrest and violence (Dubb, 1994: 12; Kosmin et al., 1999: 24). Although the 1990s have not seen the surges characteristic of periods of political unrest and violence, they have seen regular rates of emigration at considerably higher levels than during the 1970s and 1980s. In these “normal” periods, rates of emigration averaged around 1.5 per cent or less annually. In “extraordinary” periods of unrest they averaged around 3 per cent per annum (Dubb, 1994: 20-21).⁴ Data for the 1990s is more sketchy. The most common emigration estimates are in the 1500-2000 per annum range, numbers similar to past “normal” periods, but from a rapidly declining base population.⁵ If we accept David Saks 96,000 as a ballpark 1991 estimate of the base population,⁶ and take a similar intermediate figure of 75,000 for 1998; and assume zero immigration (see below) and even a considerable acceleration in the natural rate of population decrease, an average of 2,000 per annum emigration looks

like a *minimum* figure. The number would have to be *higher* if immigration were at all significant, and/or if the natural rate of decrease did not accelerate considerably. If we take the 96,000 and 75,000 figures for 1991 and 1998, or similarly benchmarked figures for these years, this implies emigration at around 2 per cent per annum. Relative to earlier periods, this is far below “extraordinary” levels, but still well above “normal” levels.

Although immigration receives less attention than emigration, it must be emphasized that this is where the greatest setbacks have occurred in the 1990s. Between 1970 and 1991, about 13,600 Jews immigrated to South Africa. During the 1970s, 7,500 immigrants came mainly from Rhodesia (25 per cent), the UK (28 per cent) and Israel (21 per cent). The 6,100 Jewish immigrants between 1980 and 1991 were largely from Israel (60 per cent) and Rhodesia (11 per cent). Additionally, about 4,500 former emigrants returned to South Africa in each of these approximate ten-year periods.⁷ Obviously, immigration from Rhodesia was a one-time source-country phenomenon. However, immigrations from the UK and Israel and the return immigration show that Jews were being attracted in significant numbers from large, vibrant Jewish communities elsewhere. Although accurate data for the 1990s are not available, most estimates are that new and return immigration has virtually ceased.⁸ The effect has been devastating. During the 1970-79 and 1980-91 periods, immigration offset 57 per cent and 58 per cent respectively of emigration. In the 1990s, by contrast, the higher-than-“normal” rate of emigration’s effect on total population has been virtually unchecked by immigration.

Destinations of Jewish emigrants

In recent decades, almost all emigrants have gone either to Israel or to an English-speaking country. Of about 21,000 emigrants in 1970-9, 37.5 per cent went to Israel, 23.7 per cent to the US, 15.2 per cent to Britain, 12.9 per cent to Australia, and 9.4 per cent to Canada. Of about 18,000 emigrants in 1980-91, only 22.6 per cent went to Israel, but 26.9 per cent to the US, 22.7 per cent to Australia, 13.5 per cent to Britain, and 12.6 per cent to Canada (Dubb, 1994: 20-21). Estimates for the 1990s show almost 40 per cent going to Australia, 20 per cent to the US, 15 per cent to Israel, and around 10 per cent each to Britain and Canada.⁹

Most writers analysing Jewish migration patterns differentiate vigorously between immigration to Israel and immigration to all other countries (Shuval, 1998). The assumption seems to be that Jewish migrants to countries other than Israel are leaving a place that they had previously considered to be home in order to find a new home. Immigration to Israel, on the other hand, is viewed as going to their “true” home. In view of the traditionally more difficult economic conditions in Israel, Zionist ideology is often viewed as the central motivation.

However, Israel has continued to close the standard of living gap vis-à-vis the more advanced developed countries. Thus, the economic disincentive to emigrate to Israel seems to have applied with significantly decreased force during the 1990s. In 1995, for example, purchasing power parity estimates of GNP per capita, on a scale where the US is at 100, are 61.1 per cent for Israel, 70.2 per cent for Australia, 71.4 per cent for Britain, and 78.3 per cent for Canada (World Bank, 197: 215).¹⁰ An economic motive would therefore predict that Israel would attract an increasing share of emigrants. But as discussed below, the opposite has been the case. Presumably, then, cultural and particularly linguistic barriers are important. Many observers believe that the majority of Jews leaving South Africa are looking to replicate the broad lifestyle – cultural as well as economic – that they have become accustomed to in South Africa. According to Isadore Rubenstein, Director of the South African Board of Jewish Education, “[T]he majority of Jews leaving South Africa are not looking for a fresh challenge and major adaptation to a new culture...”.¹¹ If anything, the ideological appeal of Israel appears to be declining.

Although a certain, declining percentage of emigrants appears to be ideologically motivated to move to Israel, this is far from being the entire story. Apart from its declining share of the total, emigration to Israel has been noticeably volatile, surging during the periods of political unrest and violence in the late 1970s and mid-1980s, and thereafter subsiding to relatively low levels. The evidence thus indicates that Israel also functions as an emergency “destination of last resort”. English-speaking destination countries have more elaborate barriers to entry which cannot easily be overcome on short notice. Hence, during periods of political unrest and violence, South African Jews most worried about their immediate safety have taken advantage of Israel’s Law of Return in the intended manner.

More recent evidence supports this interpretation of Israel as a political emergency, as well as an ideological, outlet. Just prior to South Africa’s transforming 1994 elections there was a substantial rise in inquiries concerning possible immigration to Israel. It was reported that, as of a week before the election, over 250 South African Jews had made *aliyah* from January through early April 1994. That was greater than the number for all 1992. “Political uncertainty”, the *Jerusalem Report* states, “has always boosted South African *aliyah* figures, and with the April 27 national elections looming, the number of Jews looking into moving to Israel is also at a peak” (*Jerusalem Report*, 1994: 6).¹²

Increasingly, the primary destination of Jewish emigrants from South Africa is Australia. By 1986 at least 10,000 South African Jews had settled there, adding 15 per cent to the Jewish population of that country (Elazar, 1989: 246). For example, in the 1980s the Jewish community of Perth increased from 1,500 to 5,000 persons as a result of South African immigration. In the 1990s, Perth’s Jewish community aggressively advertised the attractions of its communal life,

and continues to attract South Africans. In Sydney, entire congregations are regarded as “South African”. One South African tourist who attended services at the Masada School felt like he was in “a transit camp” when the ex-South African synagogue leader welcomed “all newly arrived South Africans” to the congregation and the country.¹³

Who is emigrating?

The lament is often heard, “We’ve lost the cream of our community”. The South African Jewish community feels it has lost a high percentage of young couples with children, as well as a high percentage of those who are professionals and well educated. According to Dubb (1994: 20-21), the emigrés are predominantly young couples and singles aged 18 to 44 and likely to be engaged in professional occupations and in managerial and entrepreneurial positions in commerce and industry, with more readily transferable skills and assets than the average South African Jew. As noted above, this has had a noticeable impact on the birth rate. There is considerable anecdotal discussion of the impact among South African Jews and in the South African Jewish press. One young Jewish woman from Johannesburg writes, “I visited my ex-South African cousins in Melbourne, Australia, in my last vacation. Only then did the often-repeated lament of the South African communal Jewish leadership become personalized for me. In Australia I met so many young, ex-South Africans who were people I would have befriended here in Johannesburg had they not emigrated because of the political climate: people with high-caliber intelligence and sound understanding. I personally, the Jewish community, and South Africans as a whole have all lost out” (*Jewish Report*, 1998: 78).

One of the groups most likely to emigrate has been Jewish physicians. South African doctors earn a much lower salary than their counterparts elsewhere. For example, a family doctor can earn as little as 100,000 rands a year or less; about \$20,000 or even less after recent devaluations. American family doctors can earn five times that amount or more. While some South African doctors earn more than the minimum and are quite affluent, establishing a medical practice in South Africa is more difficult than in the US, especially in today’s environment. Emigration is becoming increasingly appealing to South African doctors because their degrees are readily transferable, given that the quality of South African medical training is considered quite high. In addition, the new government’s emphasis on reforming South African health care services to better serve the poor has made many doctors, Jewish included, apprehensive (*Economist*, 1998: 42).

Because many emigrés are professionals, their departure has had a significant impact on the daily lives of those remaining in South Africa. Johannesburg journalist Sandy Sher, for example, is about to lose her third dentist to emigration, “I have also lost two doctors and half my family to emigration”, she

said. “They all left because of the crime and because they did not want to raise their children in a crime-ridden society” (Belling, 1998: 26).

Migration within South Africa

Before the Second World War, Jews had settled in dozens of small towns throughout South Africa. Since the Second World War, however, most of them have migrated to the larger cities (Dubb, 1994: 37). Jews tend to be a cosmopolitan people. In South Africa, the first generation set up stores and other small businesses wherever they could, often in small towns. Over time their children, and their children’s children, gravitated to larger communities to attend university, find jobs, marry, and participate in cultural activities. In dozens of small towns throughout South Africa, just as in the southern US, as the younger people have left and the older people have died, dozens of small synagogues have closed or function only on high holidays.¹⁴

Jews have not only left the small towns, they have also left and continue to leave medium-sized cities such as Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, East London, Pretoria, and even Durban. Thus, not only is South African Jewry smaller than it was 20 years ago, it is also much more concentrated, with the vast majority living in just two cities – Johannesburg and Cape Town. Durban, for example, had a Jewish community of some 7,000 in 1980; today there are only about 3,000. By 1991, Johannesburg contained about 60 per cent of the Jewish population, and Cape Town about 22 per cent.¹⁵

In the 1990s, the main lines of internal migration were within and between Johannesburg and Cape Town (Kosmin et al., 1999: 24). The Jewish population is migrating to the northern suburbs of Johannesburg and also to Cape Town, the only large metropolitan area in South Africa where blacks are not the majority. South African Jews refer to the move to Cape Town as “climbing the mast on a sinking ship” and “choosing the top deck on the Titanic” (*Forward*, 1998: 60; *Jerusalem Report*, 1994: 31).

In Johannesburg, Jewish religious and social life has shifted out of the city centre in a “northward flight” to the suburbs.¹⁶ A striking symbol of Jewish desertion is that the Wolmarans Street Shul, until recently Johannesburg’s central synagogue, is deserted and up for sale. The Shul is located in Hillbrow, once a thriving Jewish neighbourhood. Today the only Jews who remain – and there are still Jews in many of the neighbourhood’s apartment buildings – are elderly and poor. Many are religiously devout but they fear walking on the streets, even on Shabbat morning when it is light outside. Another consequence is that Yeoville, once the nerve centre of Orthodox Jewish life, is in the final stages of disintegration. Three Jewish bookstores, two Jewish bakeries, two kosher delis, and a Jewish restaurant have recently either closed or moved. Nonprofit Jewish organizations are also moving out. For example, the Beit Din itself has

already sold its building and moved. These changes are significant because Yeoville was South Africa's first truly *haredi* (ultra-Orthodox) community.¹⁷

SOME EXPLANATIONS

During the 1990s the world watched in awe as South Africa peacefully made the transition from apartheid to democracy. Compared with other countries undergoing similar political upheavals, South Africa is a relative exemplar of racial and ethnic harmony and peaceful coexistence, a model for the rest of the world because of the way the leaders of its various racial and ethnic groups methodically negotiated a “velvet revolution” and are now systematically working to remedy the injustices of apartheid. The goal of the new government is nothing less than uniting the country's historically divided and antagonistic groups into a nonracial, egalitarian, participatory democracy.

Since the historic 1994 election that brought Nelson Mandela to power, South Africa has undergone a process of slow but radical transformation. Every aspect of South African society has been tested. Not only has apartheid been dismantled, but government policies on virtually everything – housing, health, education, welfare, industrial relations, labour, employment, prisons, energy, transport, business, broadcasting, water, and sanitation, to name a few – have been and are being re-evaluated with the intent of instituting change.

As a result, life for whites in the new South Africa is much more difficult and uncertain than it was in the old South Africa. Twenty-five years ago daily living was much more structured. White people were generally guaranteed a job of some sort for life, had a house or apartment in a reasonably nice area, and could depend on relative political, economic and social stability. The rand was stable, and the security police not only insured political stability but also kept crime in white areas at an extremely low level.

South Africa today is the only English-speaking country in the world undergoing a change of this magnitude, the only country in the world in which a substantial Jewish community – some 80,000 people – lives with a black majority. Like all whites, what South African Jews most feared in the run up to the 1994 elections was large-scale political unrest and violence, possibly sponsored by elements of the African National Congress. A secondary but still serious fear was of devastating economic policies. These might have taken the form of large-scale expropriations or punitive taxation aimed at white asset holders, or of “populist” monetary, fiscal and trade policies that would produce high inflation, unemployment, economic decline, and social unrest. These political and economic fears were reflected in unusually large capital outflows in 1991-93. When these fears failed to materialize, investor confidence recovered and the economy has performed reasonably well by historical standards.¹⁸

However, early fears of political and economic catastrophe have been replaced by lesser, more chronic worries. There is still a residual fear of political radicalism, particularly as the heroic, statesman-like figure of Mandela makes way for younger leaders seeking to make names and attract followings for themselves. The economy often seems shaky – with the rand, for example, being buffeted about in the recent emerging markets financial crisis (*Johannesburg Citizen*, 1998: 1). Even more worrisome for whites, new affirmative action policies may significantly limit opportunities, particularly for young people. An unanticipated negative effect of the transition has been an explosion of violent crime. Non-violent crimes aimed at property can be regarded as an economic nuisance, but the same cannot be said for violent crime. For example, the murder rate has surged more than two-fold since the late 1980s (*Jerusalem Report*, 1994: 30). Even more important, the end of apartheid has brought an end to race-based policing methods that had long insulated the white community from South Africa's high violent crime rates. The recent large-scale, government sponsored *Victims of Crime Survey* indicates that the white population is significantly more likely than the black to be affected by violent crime in South Africa (Hirschowitz et al., 1998: Tables 5.2, 5.4). For whites, this represents a far greater increase in exposure to violent crime than even a doubling of general violent crime rates. A final factor is the receptiveness of English-speaking destination countries. A sudden increase in receptiveness would obviously facilitate a larger “non-emergency” outflow – with Israel continuing to provide an outlet for unplanned outflows generated by sudden adverse changes.

Which of these factors offers the most persuasive explanation for the dramatic decline of South Africa's Jewish community in the 1990s? The pattern that must be explained is the increase in rate of population decline. As noted above, this has not taken the form of sudden higher-than-normal bursts of net emigration. Rather it has occurred predominantly in the form of an increase in the “normal” rate of emigration and a collapse of immigration relative to levels during the 1970s and 1980s.

Fears of large-scale political violence and economic collapse with the transition to black majority rule

Since these fears did not materialize, a predicted large surge in net emigration in the early 1990s would be followed by a return to “normal” rates of net emigration typical of the past. However, the pattern is rather that the rate of emigration was below that of past periods of political unrest, but at levels higher, but still much closer to, rates of emigration during periods of stability during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, this “high-normal” rate of emigration did not subside after Mandela's conciliatory and moderate policies ended fears of large-scale political violence and economic collapse. Similarly, South Africa has not recovered its earlier ability to attract new immigrants from thriving Jewish communities abroad, especially from Israel.

If emigration had been driven primarily by fears of immediate political threats to physical safety and economic viability, then the expected pattern familiar from the late 1970s and mid-1980s is a surge in last-minute emigration to Israel. As noted, there was some evidence of such last-minute emigration in the run up to the 1994 elections. However, the share of emigrants going to Israel continued to *fall* from its historic proportions during the 1990s, so that the overall evidence is quite inconsistent with the hypothetical causes associated with political “emergency”.

Finally, the political emergency hypotheses cannot explain pronounced changes in the pattern of internal migration. Systemic political and economic risks cannot be reliably escaped by moving to the suburbs or to other metropolitan areas. Rather, internal migration would be a waste of time and resources that should rationally be focused on arranging one’s flight abroad.

Chronic economic difficulties

The prospect of generally poorer rates of economic growth, of more frequent recessions and balance of payments crises, and of declining prospects for whites, in particular due to affirmative action policies, are potentially a better explanation for long-term increases in “normal” rates of net emigration. However, the explanation is weaker than it looks. First, it is not clear that general economic prospects have deteriorated sufficiently to explain such a large surge in net emigration. More important, economic prospects have clearly improved since 1994. Therefore, this explanation would predict a less pronounced increase in the normal rate of net emigration to 1994, thereafter converging back towards normal levels. After all, macroeconomic performance since 1994 is not dramatically worse than historical standards. However, surge in the normal rate of net emigration has not declined since 1994.

What about fear of affirmative action policies? This explanation too has weaknesses. Recall that we are focusing on Jewish rather than white net emigration. But affirmative action policies adversely affect all whites as a group. Given their traditionally high levels of education attainment, Jews are less adversely affected than whites as a whole because they can compete on an unrestricted basis for “white” slots.¹⁹ Jews have also traditionally maintained unusually high rates of self-employment. Once it became clear after 1994 that affirmative action policies would not be draconian, one would predict a recovery in confidence and a decline in emigration rates. Again, recovery has not occurred. Finally, we have seen that the collapse in immigration has been even greater than the increase in the normal rate of emigration. Presumably, Britons and Israelis coming to South Africa in the past were not attracted by the prospect of going to South African universities or landing government or corporate jobs. Rather, they tended to be qualified professionals and particularly entrepreneurs, the sort least likely to be deterred by affirmative action policies

per se. Affirmative action policies therefore would not be expected to have a large and regular enough effect on Jewish economic prospects to explain the dramatic surge in net emigration during the 1990s, and particularly its persistence after 1994. Nor can general economic prospects and affirmative action policies explain the new patterns of internal migration. The impacts of reduced general economic prospects and affirmative action policies are not avoided by moving to Johannesburg's suburbs or to Cape Town.

Violent crime

A surge in rates of violent crime, on the other hand, does provide a consistent explanation of the lasting surge in normal rates of net emigration. Unlike hypothetical chronic economic worries, surging violent crime rates are of a magnitude, and above all a regularity, sufficient to account for the persistence of high-normal rates of emigration after 1994. Like chronic economic worries, a surge in violent crime rates is of the non-emergency character consistent with the increasing concentration of emigration to English-speaking countries (particularly Australia) compared with Israel. If violent crime had been such an important factor after 1994, presumably it was similarly influential before 1994. Furthermore, violent crime was presumably not only influential in itself, but also as a factor intensifying political fears and chronic economic worries. On the other hand, the ability of political fear and chronic economic worries to explain the full surge in net emigration even *prior to* 1994 is called into question by the failure of the surge to noticeably subside after 1994.

Also significantly, increased exposure to violent crime is the only explanation that can account for the pattern of internal migration during the 1990s. The collapse of urban Jewish Johannesburg neighbourhoods, and the flight to tightly guarded suburbs and to "white" Cape Town, are consistent with a desire to escape skyrocketing exposure to violent crime.

The 1998 KC/IJPR National Survey asked a number of questions about emigration. Twelve per cent of those surveyed said that they were very likely to leave over the next five years, and another 15 per cent said that they were fairly likely to leave. Of those in these two categories, 52 per cent listed concern for their personal safety as their primary motive (Kosmin et al., 1999: 3, 20-25).²⁰ Of the other 48 per cent in these two categories, approximately two-thirds listed personal safety as their second or third most important motive.

It is also worth noting that the South African Jewish press and communal organizations are far more preoccupied with violent crime than with other hypothesized causal factors. White South Africans, including Jews, appear to fear crime and violence more than anything else. Accurate statistics are difficult to obtain, as the government restricts release of crime figures. According to the World Health Organization, however, rising rates of violent crime have

made South Africa the most murderous country in the world. In 1995 an armed robbery occurred on average every five minutes, and a burglary every three minutes. A murder occurred every 29 minutes (*US News and World Report*, 1995: 44). The 1995 murder rate of 53.5 persons per 100,000 was one of the highest in the world, more than five times that of the US. By 1997, that rate had increased to seven times the US rate (*Economist*, 1997: 17).²¹

The press in Johannesburg – home to the majority of South African Jews – is particularly obsessed with crime. According to one media source, in Johannesburg alone, a city of 6 million people, reported incidents of rape increased by 64 per cent (from 502 to 823) during the last half of 1996. In April 1997, 14,410 violent crimes were committed in Johannesburg. In Hillbrow, a crowded, once heavily concentrated Jewish inner city neighbourhood, 2,035 violent crimes were reported – over 60 a day. These figures exclude statistics from crime-ridden Soweto, South Africa's largest black township (*Jerusalem Report*, 1997: 62). Car hijacking, especially in Johannesburg, has become incredibly common. Hijackers approach a car, usually an expensive one and mostly at a red traffic light. They force the driver to relinquish the car at gunpoint. In the more fortunate cases the hijackers drive away with the car, leaving the driver unharmed; in other situations they shoot the driver, sometimes without provocation. In 1995, there were about 17,000 such hijackings. These involved 36 heavily reported murders (*US News and World Report*, 1995: 44), the vast majority of which occurred in Johannesburg (*Argus*, 1995: 12).

The effect of these hijacking murders, as well as some highly publicized break-in murders in affluent white suburbs, has been to produce renewed paranoia, and sometimes hysteria, in many white homes. Affluent Johannesburg houses often have guard dogs, barbed wire, electronic sensors, closed-circuit television monitors, and even electrified fences. Private armed patrol companies are common. Some neighbourhoods petition the city to allow them to wall off their areas and post a 24-hour guard at a single entry-exit point. Cars often travel in convoys, and armed guards are becoming a familiar sight on street corners (*Jerusalem Report* 1997: 62-63).

It appears that rising violence is causing many Jews, in particular younger ones, to consider and reconsider emigration. The perception is that an exodus is underway. A 1995 front-page article in *The Sunday Independent*, a prestigious South African weekly, described the flood of emigration after the King David School in Linksfield, Johannesburg, finished the school year: "The Board of Jewish Education's official figure for pupils leaving the two Johannesburg day schools to emigrate is 77 [of a school population of approximately 1,500 students]. But the consensus from the emigrant families who spoke to the *Independent* is that the figure is much higher". The newspaper described how many of the families had been subjected to muggings, break-ins, attempted murder, and other acts of violence. One woman stated that she was watching

television when machine-gun fire disturbed her: “Then the lights went out and before locking myself in my bathroom and pushing the panic button, I peered out the window to see eight men armed with machine guns in my garden trying to get into the house” (1995: 1).

The KC/IJPR Survey and anecdotal press reports show the impact of the events measured in the crime statistics and the *Victims of Crime Survey*. Patterns indicated by objective evidence are consistent with subjective understandings of the Jewish population. It is not just that the major changes in Jewish migration patterns appear to be driven by the surge in violent crime; it is also that Jews appear to understand their actions primarily in these terms.

Entry policies of destination countries

Since emigrants have increasingly gone to English-speaking countries, it is possible that the large increase in net emigration is due to more permissive immigration policies in these countries. This explanation, however, is a complement rather than a substitute for other explanations. It potentially accounts for why more were able to move to certain destinations, but not why people prefer to leave in the first place. Moreover, it cannot be easily reconciled with the “emergency” or political fear explanations. Such desperate emigrants would not remain “pent up” in South Africa, waiting for visas to English-speaking countries, when it is always possible to go to Israel – even if only temporarily. Moreover, better access to foreign destinations does not help explain the fall in immigration or the change in internal migration patterns. The “improved access” explanation would be most consistent with the chronic economic worries and violent crime explanations. The scenario would be that either or both these factors created a stock of would-be emigrants that exceeded the past absorption capacity of the English-speaking countries, and that a relaxation of entry barriers in the 1990s made possible an increased rate of emigration. Even assuming that this scenario is correct, the chronic economic worries explanation cannot account for why emigration rates did not subside after 1994.

In practice, the increase in emigration rates is almost entirely accounted for by Australia. Hence, the improved access explanation is potentially relevant only if Australian immigration policies in particular became more permissive in the 1990s. But there is no evidence of such relaxation in Australian entry barriers. Rates of immigration to Australia in the 1990s are no larger than in previous decades, and Australian immigration policies have not changed in the last decade in a manner that increased the access of South Africans relative to other populations.²² Rather, it appears that Australia provides a highly comparable cultural setting, and that the recent surge in Jewish emigration to Australia relative to other English-speaking destination countries is due to threshold effects after the establishment of sufficiently large South African Jewish communities in the 1970s and 1980s.

ATTITUDINAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF INTENTION TO EMIGRATE

The 1998 KC/IJPR Survey provides a cross-sectional means of testing the apparent causes of net emigration over time. In particular, if the higher-than-previously-normal rate of emigration is due more to rising violent crime rates than to the other factors mentioned, this should be reflected in the attitudes of randomly selected South African Jewish subjects in 1998. Also, the Survey makes it possible to assess the demographic characteristics of respondents expressing an intention to emigrate. A knowledge of such demographic characteristics provides a basis for assessing the likely impact of emigration by the remaining South African Jewish Community.

For a measure of intention to emigrate, we classify respondents into two groups based upon whether they believed they were fairly likely or very likely to emigrate within five years, or fairly likely or very likely to stay in South Africa. A number of attitudinal questions are directly relevant to our explanatory issue. First, respondents ranked the economic situation, the political situation, and their personal safety in South Africa at present. These rankings are on a scale from one to five, one being best and five worst. Also, respondents were asked if they agreed that the quality of their lives would improve over the next five years, and if they agreed that most Jews under 30 do not see a future for themselves in South Africa. Answers were on a scale of one to five, with strong agreement ranked one, and strong disagreement five.

Relations between intention to emigrate and the attitudinal measures are given in Table 1 (page 30). Models 1 and 2 estimate parameters using logit, and Models 3 and 4 using ordinary least squares (OLS). The logit estimates are more appropriate theoretically, because the OLS estimates assume that relations between the dependent and independent variables are linear in probability. But the OLS results are similar, and are presented because they are easier to interpret. Models 1 and 3 include all the attitudinal questions, whereas Models 2 and 4 include only the rankings of the economic situation, political situation, and personal safety.

The results are consistent across the Models. Perhaps not surprising, expected personal quality of life over the next five years is the most statistically significant and powerful variable in Models 1 and 3. Of the three variables assessing the situation in South Africa, personal safety is the most statistically significant and powerful. This is true whether or not the questions on personal future and future of young Jews are included. With the exception of the economic situation in South Africa, all the attitudinal questions exhibit the expected relation with intention to emigrate.

Why do the attitudinal questions not explain more of the variation in intention to emigrate? People do not consider emigration easily. Of the valid responses

in the sample, 645 ranked personal safety as very poor, 252 as fairly poor, 55 as neither good nor poor, 42 as fairly good, and three as very good. Similarly, 472 ranked the economic situation as very poor, and 383 as fairly poor; and 424 ranked the political situation as very poor, and 300 as fairly poor. By contrast, 436 said that they were very likely to continue living in South Africa over the next five years, 275 fairly likely, 146 fairly likely to leave, and 121 very likely to leave. However, it is still notable that negative assessments of personal safety have the strongest attitudinal relation to intent to emigrate.

Consider how age, education, Jewish religiosity, and occupation are related to intention to emigrate. Education is measured at intervals of one on a scale from one to nine, with one indicating failure to graduate high school, and nine indicating a doctoral degree. We use a three-level measure of Jewish religiosity. Three indicates strictly orthodox, two traditional, and one covers all lesser levels of observance (including no observance). Occupation is ranked on a scale from one to seven, one indicating a professional occupation, two a managerial, three a semi-professional, four a salesperson, five a technical or artisanal occupation, six a clerical position, and seven a manual or routine non-manual job. Relations between intention to emigrate and the demographic variables are given in Table 2 (page 31). Model 5 estimates parameters using logit, and Model 6 using OLS (linear probability).

Only age is statistically significant, and the other variables have little explanatory power. As South African Jews widely believe, younger people are much more likely to consider emigration. Higher education, more skilled occupations, and greater Jewish religiosity²³ are also associated with a higher likelihood of intention to emigrate. But their impact is negligible after controlling for age.

THE IMPACT OF EMIGRATION ON THE REMAINING SOUTH AFRICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

There are at least three important effects of the precipitous decline in the Jewish population during the 1990s. First, there has been acceleration in the community's long-term tendency to become older. Second, the more secular communities appear to be more severely affected. Third, there has been a significant migration and downsizing of communal institutions, particularly those serving the more secular part of the population.

Because younger singles and families have dominated emigration, the demographic profile of the community has become increasingly top-heavy (Dubb, 1994: 47-49). Many of the large number of elderly Jews are in particularly vulnerable positions. The wealthier, of course, can afford to migrate to safer areas, hire guards, and take other safety precautions. Others are not so lucky. Many of the Jewish elderly have children who have emigrated and often have

little sustained contact with their parents. The emigration of so many persons aged 25 to 40 has had an enormous negative impact on the economic and psychological well-being of the parents. Many of the Jewish elderly in Johannesburg live in apartment blocks in run-down and dangerous neighbourhoods, where they are easy prey for muggers, robbers, and petty thieves. As one recent report described them, "The majority of these senior citizens are alone because so many have family living overseas and have no local relatives to care for them. These old people have become virtual prisoners in their homes because of muggings by criminals and interference from vagrants in the area" (Dubb, 1994). Another report commented, "Lonely and often poverty stricken, they are house-bound by old age, illness and fear..." (*South African Jewish Times*, 1995: 3).

Although the entire community has been hard hit by large net emigration and internal migration, there is a definite contrast between the more, and the less, observant sections of the community. The survey data analysed above indicate that, if anything, more religious Jews are more likely to emigrate.²⁴ Nevertheless, religious communities appear to have remained more stable. Indeed, there is much discussion of a pronounced strengthening of interest in traditional Jewish life and community. The 1991 Survey reported by Dubb showed that synagogue affiliation and attendance had increased markedly since 1974. The 1998 KC/IJPR Survey shows continuation of this trend. Both surveys show extremely high levels of ritual observance. The 1998 Survey notes the rapid growth of the Ba'al Teshuva (religious revival) movement, and reports that 43 per cent said that their Jewish identity became stronger (as against 49 per cent who said it remained the same, and 8 per cent who said it became weaker) (Dubb, 1994: 107-116; Kosmin et al., 1999, 13-14). For a number of related reasons, this is not altogether surprising.

Imagine two hypothetical communities, one more orthodox and the other more weakly religious, both scattered across a wide region. The more orthodox community will have a higher density of communal institutions and communal life, in which each individual participates more intensively. Suppose each community loses a significant percentage of its population over a number of years. The more religious community will have an easier time maintaining or consolidating institutions and communal life – since it takes fewer individuals or families to maintain the necessary financial and social critical mass. The more secular community will more often experience a breakdown of local institutions, and be forced to choose between detachment from the community or migration.

In a pattern familiar from the experience of declining inner cities in the US, orthodox communities are more likely to stay put around their sabbath-oriented housing-synagogue clusters. Consider young adults who are secular or less observant to begin with. The relative decline of secular communities faces them with a choice of two alternative viable communities. They can emigrate

to Australia or another foreign country, or “semi-grate” to the Johannesburg suburbs or “white” Cape Town. Or they can affiliate with the still-vibrant traditional communities.

As noted above, the South African Jewish community is an unusually homogeneous one – with a strongly *Litvak* cultural core. This may be one important explanation of the fact that South African Jews are unusually observant compared with large Jewish populations in other parts of the world – particularly comparable populations in English-speaking countries. In 1991, nearly two-thirds of all Jews were affiliated with orthodox synagogues; in 1998 over 70 per cent were affiliated. Given that in 1998 only 39 per cent claimed to attend synagogue once a week or more, it is evident that orthodox synagogue membership does not imply the same level of observance as it does in other English-speaking countries. However, there is evidence of very high levels of observance. Around 40 per cent keep separate meat and dairy eating and cooking utensils and buy kosher meat, and almost 20 per cent observe Sabbath restrictions. The picture is of an unusually large observant share of the population, with unusually strong ties to the institutions and communities of the most observant sector of the population.²⁵ In an environment where secular and less observant Jewish life appears to be coming rapidly unglued, it makes sense that many hitherto less observant members of such a population are drawn to the more vibrant and resilient traditional communities.

Glen Hazel has become the centre of the orthodox revival in Johannesburg. There are numerous synagogues, kosher restaurants and educational institutions throughout the suburb. Many streets and even areas have booms and guards that can close off sections to provide residents with added security. The booms also mean that only drivers that have a specific reason for being on the street are admitted, and this has the indirect impact of minimizing traffic, particularly on Shabbat. Thus, the neighbourhood has a Shabbat atmosphere that is unheard of in most Diaspora communities, even in heavily Jewish neighbourhoods. It also creates an atmosphere in which people feel relatively comfortable walking to and from synagogue, which would otherwise seem to be an almost suicidal activity in crime-ridden Johannesburg.

Jews who decide to remain in South Africa clearly face the challenge of decreasing communal resources. Observers see upkeep of the communal infrastructure as a major challenge, which will become more and more difficult.²⁶ An address marking the induction of the incoming Executive and Council of the Durban Progressive Jewish Congregation noted, “Our communal institutions – especially our welfare bodies – will be facing a Herculean uphill task in which the traditional concept of *tzadaka* [religiously-mandated charitable activity] will have to assume new dimensions”. The speaker, Marcus Arkin, emphasized the effects of emigration on age patterns and communal resource needs. “Because of this drastic decline in the size of the community, the working-age

segments, those aged 25 to 64, have fallen significantly, leading to a notable upswing in the dependency ratio". For every 100 persons in the working population of the Jewish community in 1980, there were 61 dependent children and 36 elderly. In 1991 the proportion was 65 and 49, respectively.²⁷ This trend has accelerated since 1991.²⁸

CONCLUSION

How far will the present trend proceed? Is there a future for the South Africa Jewish community? There appear to be two answers to this question. One, for the secular and less observant part of the community, is "not much of a future". This part of the community seems likely to either emigrate, slowly die off, or assimilate into the white populations in Johannesburg suburbs and in Cape Town. The other answer, for the orthodox and more observant part of the community, is "much more of a future". The decline of some orthodox neighbourhoods in the face of rising crime shows that the more observant are far from being immune to the pressures and incentives affecting the less observant. In fact, survey data show that the more religious are if anything more likely to emigrate. However, these communities are likely to be more resistant to break-up. It is easier for even relatively small orthodox communities to maintain institutions and collective life. Much depends, however, on whether African National Congress-led governments can continue Mandela's policies of moderation and reconciliation (Kaplan, 1996), and on whether they can implement policies to improve economic performance and particularly to reduce violent crime. If not, even the communities of the more observant will sooner or later follow those of the less observant.

It is a tremendous credit to Mandela that by the end of his term in June 1999, people in the country expected a relatively smooth transition, whereas in the year preceding the first democratic elections of 1994 4,400 persons died in political violence. The second democratic elections took place in an atmosphere of almost complete quiet, and the election of the ANC's Thabo Mbeki was expected. Mbeki promised to continue building a multi-racial society and to try and speed up the pace of positive change. Mbeki stated that in the second five years of democratic rule, "The policies will remain the same, but in the second five years we are better placed to move faster because of the foundation that has been laid" (*Newsweek*, 1999: 41). When a reporter asked him whether he would stress reconciliation between the races just as Mandela had done, he responded that: "The policy of national reconciliation remains very important to the future of South Africa...We need to pursue the notion of national reconciliation, to develop a South Africa in which all South Africans – black and white – develop a common patriotism and overcome the distrust and racial antagonisms of the past" (p.42).

The government and many South African Jewish leaders often attempt to conceal or deny information that most regard as bad news. For example, the government refuses to make available detailed information on violent crime rates before 1994, making comparisons with the apartheid period difficult. The official justification of this policy is that a number of autonomous black regions with severe crime problems were not included in apartheid-era statistics, and therefore making available such statistics would cast post-apartheid South Africa in an artificially negative light. But it is hard to see why apartheid-era statistics cannot be provided along with post-apartheid statistics *for comparable geographic areas*. The government appears to be trying to hide bad news. If it is not, then its restrictions are artificially fanning the worries of a white population that feels besieged by violent crime.

Jewish communal institutions, in particular the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, have persistently tried to counter the perception that Jews are emigrating at higher rates than other white groups (*Australian Jewish News*, 1994: 21; Harris, 1997; *South African Jewish Times*, 1996a: 2; *South African Jewish Times*, 1996b: 7). The SAJBD feels it has an obligation to try and prevent a sense of panic from taking over the Jewish community. For example, in response to a 1995 article about the large number of Jews emigrating from South Africa to Australia, Marlene Bethlehem, National Chairperson of the SAJBD, wrote, “We feel this [article] highlights the impression that only or mainly people of the Jewish faith are leaving South Africa at this time. Given that Jews make up only 0.25 per cent of the population – and only 2 per cent of ‘the white segment,’ this is a false impression. We are disappointed that your article reinforces it as if Jewish South Africans were less eager and involved in helping to build the new South Africa” (*Friendly Independent*, 1995: 11). Bethlehem went on to say that while it is true that some people are leaving the country and that some are of the Jewish faith, Jews are not a majority of the emigrants, and “our statistics show that they are not a majority among Jewish South Africans”. But Bethlehem does not deny that Jews are over-represented in the group emigrating. In other words, Jews are emigrating at a faster rate than other white groups. Like the government, the Board appears to be making an effort to conceal bad news. The Board’s policy has been not to release data on any research conducted on emigration.

The extent to which South African Jews will do as Mandela, Mbeki and their own community leaders implore is not yet clear. However, such noble sentiments are not in themselves likely to have a significant impact. The 1998 KC/IJPR Survey documents a rather depressing situation. Twenty-seven per cent of respondents were very or fairly likely to emigrate in the next five years. Sixty-five per cent disagree that, “The quality of my life will improve over the next five years” (13 per cent agree, 19 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed). Eighty-seven per cent agreed that, “It is likely that most Jews under the age of

30 years do not see a future for themselves in South Africa” (5 per cent disagreed, 8 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed). Sixty-one per cent disagreed that, “There will still be a substantial Jewish community in South Africa in 20 years” (22 per cent agreed, 17 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed) (Kosmin et al., 1999: 3, 20-21, 25).

Present trends will not change unless there is some change in the objective factors driving them. Right now, the Jewish population is shrinking rapidly under the impact of high crime rates and uninspiring economic prospects. High violent crime rates in particular appear to be decimating the less observant communities. The relative resilience of the more observant communities is at present the chief source of hope for the future of the Jewish community in South Africa. But more observant Jews appear to be emigrating at an even higher rate.

NOTES

1. A summary of the 1998 Survey results is given by Kosmin et al. (1999). We thank Dr Milton Shain, Director of the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies at the University of Cape Town, for making the survey questionnaire and data available to us. The Survey is based on a random sample of 1,000 Jewish adults.
2. World Jewish Congress Report, 24 November 1995.
3. For details on data and estimates through 1991, see Dubb, 1994. For low and high 1996/98 estimates calculated analogously to those of Dubb for 1991, we thank David Saks, Senior Researcher, South African Jewish Board of Deputies. Personal communication, 26 March 1999. See also the discussions in Dubb and Shain, 1993: 332-3, and Shain, 1999: 417-418.
4. The Central Statistics Service (CSS) maintains official records on emigration, but their migration statistics do not indicate religious affiliation. In addition, CSS statistics are based on forms filled out by emigrants close to their time of departure, and not everyone necessarily tells the truth. Personal correspondence, Steven Friedman, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, 6 October 1998.
5. Marlene Bethlehem, conference speech, August 1998; *Jerusalem Report*, 1999: 31.
6. See note 2.
7. Dubb, 1994: 16-9; personal correspondence, Marcus Arkin, 23-24 September 1998.
8. See note 2.
9. IUA/UCF records for 1997-8, provided by David Saks; Anthony Arkin, interview, 17 July 1998. The 1998 survey results of Kosmin et al. (1999: 25) show that the trend of increasing popularity of Australia is continuing.
10. The gap is still smaller if the generous benefits provided by Israel to new immigrants are taken into account.
11. Isadore Rubenstein, personal correspondence, 8 October 1998.
12. *Aliyah* emissary Asher Cailingold explained that not all of these Jews wanted to emigrate to Israel. Most hoped to move to Australia, Canada, or the US, and also

- wanted to know if Israel could help if they needed to leave South Africa in a great hurry. Others wanted to protect themselves by acquiring an Israeli passport, without actually going to live in Israel. Cailingold estimated that about one in three of the South African Jews he had interviewed during that period had an immigration date in mind. "The other two," he said, "are taking out an insurance policy".
13. Cyril Saxe, interview, 16 July 1996.
 14. Moshe Silverhaft, Rabbi to Country Communities, interview, 15 July 1998.
 15. Dubb, 1994: 38-9; Marcus Arkin, personal interview, 24 September 1998.
 16. David Saks, personal correspondence, 2 May 1998.
 17. Cyril K. Harris, personal correspondence, 6 May 1998.
 18. Real GDP data are available from Government of South Africa, 1999. Since 1970, South Africa has experienced healthy but volatile rates of growth. The performance since 1994 is broadly similar, and it is too early to say whether significant differences in long-term growth rates will emerge.
 19. An analogy would be Asians in the US. As long as they are lumped with the "white" population, Asians are much less affected by affirmative action policies aimed at increasing representation of blacks and Hispanics.
 20. The other survey choices offered specifically to explain plans to emigrate do not generally distinguish clearly among the other motives considered here. Fifteen per cent listed reunification with family as their primary motive, 15 per cent worried about the future of South Africa, and 9 per cent the education of their children. Only 6.4 per cent mentioned career benefits as their primary motive, and 0.9 per cent cited a desire to escape the consequences of South Africa's affirmative action policies. In a separate question, the sample listed police and law enforcement as the most important fiscal priority for the South African government.
 21. Murder rates are estimated to have doubled in the last ten years.
 22. Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1999; Barr Welsby, Immigration Counselor of the Australian government, personal correspondence, 25 July 1999.
 23. We also tried some dichotomous measures of religiosity – purchasing only kosher meat and separating meat and milk in the home, and observing Sabbath restrictions on driving and travelling. The positive relations with intention to emigrate are similar to that for the three-level Jewish religiosity measure – although the more orthodox Sabbath observers are somewhat less likely to emigrate than the larger group obeying the dietary laws.
 24. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we examine this relationship more explicitly.
 25. In a speech to the South African Jewish Board of Deputies in April 1999, the well-known demographer Barry Kosmin told the South African Jewish leaders, "You are the super-Jews of the world".
 26. Anthony Arkin, personal correspondence, 17 July 1998. See also the discussions in Shain, 1998: 405-6, and Shain, 1999: 418-9.
 27. Marcus Arkin, 1996: 2, 4; Marcus Arkin, personal correspondence, 24 September 1998.
 28. The declining Jewish community has already forced communal organizations to downsize or merge. Many individuals and organizations have resisted consolidation of unnecessarily duplicated organizations, activities and budgets. The Durban Jewish newspaper, *Hashalom*, printed a front-page editorial encouraging people to accept the necessity of mergers and downsizing (JBN, 1996: 1).

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
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
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FIGURE 1
POST-WAR CHANGES IN SIZE OF SOUTH AFRICAN JEWISH POPULATION



Source: Dubb, 1994; Saks, 1999. "High" and "low" refer to different methods of estimating 1991 and 1996/1998 populations.

FIGURE 2
ANNUAL PER CENT RATE OF CHANGE OF SOUTH AFRICAN JEWISH POPULATION



Source: Annual rate of change in 1970-1980 was -0.02 per cent.

TABLE 1
 RELATIONS BETWEEN INTENTION TO EMIGRATE
 AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS ONE'S ENVIRONMENT

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Economy	-0.017 (0.106)	-0.001 (0.019)	0.059 (0.101)	0.011 (0.019)
Politics	0.058 (0.095)	0.010 (0.018)	0.136 (0.090)	0.027 (0.017)
Personal safety	0.284** (0.120)	0.044** (0.020)	0.347*** (0.117)	0.057*** (0.020)
Personal future	0.426*** (0.084)	0.077*** (0.015)		
Jewish future	-0.122 (0.107)	-0.022 (0.020)		
Constant	-3.839*** (0.686)	-0.204* (0.116)	-3.363*** (0.574)	-0.134 (0.096)
Log likelihood	-530.905		-558.550	
R ²		0.054		0.022
Adjusted R ²		0.049		0.019
F		10.718***		7.217***
N	941	941	968	968

*** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10.

TABLE 2
RELATIONS BETWEEN INTENTION TO EMIGRATE
AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

	Model 5	Model 6
Age	-0.048*** (0.006)	-0.008*** (0.001)
Education	0.051 (0.051)	0.008 (0.009)
Jewish Religiosity	0.107 (0.124)	0.020 (0.022)
Occupation	0.051 (0.043)	0.009 (0.008)
Constant	0.585 (0.440)	0.549*** (0.077)
Log likelihood	-465.867	
R ²		0.097
Adjusted R ²		0.093
F		24.011***
N	900	900

*** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10.

L'EXODE JUIF DE LA NOUVELLE AFRIQUE DU SUD: REALITES ET CONSEQUENCES

Durant les années 90, la population juive de l'Afrique du Sud a décliné à un rythme sans précédent, une évolution qui contrastait vivement avec celle des populations juives dans d'autres pays de langue anglaise.

Parmi les explications possibles, il faut citer la crainte de l'instabilité et des violences politiques, la dégradation des conditions et des perspectives économiques, la crainte d'une politique gouvernementale directement discriminatoire, la hausse de la délinquance violente et les politiques migratoires plus permissives adoptées par des pays de destination attrayants.

Chacun des facteurs susmentionnés, hormis le dernier, semble avoir joué un certain rôle. Toutefois, seule l'évolution de la délinquance violente peut expliquer la brusque montée de l'émigration juive, laquelle s'est poursuivie même après la transition politique et économique réussie sous un pouvoir à majorité noire et sous le gouvernement modéré du Congrès National Africain.

L'évolution de la criminalité donne également l'explication la plus satisfaisante des changements connexes intervenus au niveau des schémas migratoires internes.

EL ÉXODO JUDÍO DESDE LA NUEVA SUDÁFRICA: REALIDADES Y REPERCUSIONES

En los años noventa, la población judía de Sudáfrica disminuyó a un ritmo sin precedentes en comparación a las poblaciones judías de otros países de habla inglesa.

Las explicaciones posibles incluyen el temor a la inestabilidad política y la violencia política, el deterioro de las condiciones y perspectivas económicas, el temor de políticas gubernamentales directamente discriminatorias, el creciente aumento en los crímenes violentos y políticas inmigratorias más flexibles en los países de destino deseados.

Todos estos factores, salvo el último, parecen haber desempeñado un papel en lo antedicho. No obstante, sólo el aumento en los crímenes violentos ofrece una explicación de un incremento sin precedentes en la emigración neta, persistente incluso después de una transición política y económica acertada a un régimen mayoritariamente negro, bajo gobiernos moderados del Congreso Nacional Africano.

Los cambios en las tasas del crimen también ofrecen la explicación más satisfactoria para los cambios relativos a los patrones de migración interna.